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PERSPECTIVE

CARSTEN THOMAS EBENROTH*

Gaining Access to Fortress Europe-

Recognition of U.S. Corporations in
Germany' and the Revision of the
Seat Rule
Whether the Federal Republic of Gerrr 'y recognizes the legal status of foreign2
companies depends upon the effective place of business or the so-called "seat rule.'
The "seat rule," 3 which has not yet been codified in German law, claims that the legal
status 4 of a company is governed by the laws of the country where business is primarily
transacted, that is, where management is located and principal decisions are made and
*Refendar J.D., 1967; M.B.A., 1968; Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Dr. Rer. Pot., 1969;
Doktor der Rechte, S.J.D., 1971; Privatdozent, 1974; Free University Berlin School of Law,
International Business, Tax, Economic and Financial Law Chair; University of Konstanz, Federal
Republic of Germany; Counsellor at law in the law firm of Whitman & Ransom, New York.
1. Germany, as used here, designates Federal Republic of Germany.
2.

C. EBENROTH, DIE VERDECKTEN VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN IM TRANSNATIONALEN UNTERNEH-

367-77 (1979) [hereinafter VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN]; C. EBENROTH, KONZERNKOLLISIONSRECHT IM
WANDEL AUSSENWIRTSCHAFrLICHER ZIELE 13 (1978) [hereinafter KONZERNKOLLISIONSRECHT]; G. KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRiVATRECHT 366 (6th ed. 1987); Ebenroth, Commentary, MONCHENER KOMMENTAR, BiURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB], vol. 7, art. 10 EGBGB, annot. 153 (K. Rebmann &
F.J. Sdcker eds., 1st ed. 1983, 2d ed. 1986); Grossfeld, Commentary, STAUDINGER, Intemationales
MEN

Gesellschaftsrecht,

in J.

VON STAUDINGER,

KOMMENTAR

ZUM

BURGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH

Vol.

EGBGB, Einleitung zu art. 7, annot. 19 (Henrich & Hoffmann eds. 12th ed. 1983); Laideritz,
Commentary, SOERGEL, BGB, vol. 8, art. 7, annot. 150 (W. Siebert l1th ed. 1984).
3. The "seat rule," as used here, means the doctrine of the effective domicile of the
corporation, the effective place of business and/or the main place of administration.
4. See Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2. annot. 155 (1st ed.); Grossfeld, Commentary,
supra note 2, annot. 166.
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announced. Whereas Rabel considers the effective place of business to be wherever
"the central management and control are exercised, ' 5 for Beale the main criterion
is "where the directors usually meet or the general meetings of the stockholders are."6
Despite some opposing views in German jurisprudence, 7 the "seat rule" can
be virtually considered established law. 8 The application of the rule to foreign
companies involves significant legal problems. Since German corporate law
governs the legal status of business enterprises in Germany, a foreign firm
incorporated according to foreign law that shifts its effective place of business to
Germany automatically falls into liquidation. The transfer of operations to
Germany is only possible by liquidating the original company and reincorporating in accordance with German law. The same situation also applies to business
enterprises incorporated under German law that shift their effective place of
business to a country where the "seat rule" is also in effect. 9
As can be readily seen, the "seat rule" can have a far-reaching and restrictive
influence on corporations whenever business operations are transferred to
another country. Since in Germany there are only limited possibilities for the
public supervision of companies, control is largely exercised by the mechanisms
of private corporate law. At the moment, however, it is being debated whether
the "seat rule" in Germany may not be supplanted in certain cases by
supranational law or by bilateral agreements on the protection of foreign
investments concluded between Germany and other countries. 10 Such agreements generally contain provisions concerning commercial relations, the right to
set up and conduct business, and the recognition of a corporation's legal status.
Among these treaties, the most important is the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation (TFCN) between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United
States, dated October 29, 1954.11 The present article concerns the question of
whether, and to what extent, this U.S.-German agreement affects the role the
"seat rule" plays in the interpretations of German jurisprudence and case law.

5. 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 40 (1960).
6. 2 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 765 (1935).
7. G. GRASMANN, SYSTEM DESINTERNATIONALEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS 470 (1970); H. KopPENSTEINER, INTERNATIONALE UNTERNEHMEN IM DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 105, 121 (1971); see
also Behrens, Commentary, M. HACHENBURG, GMBHGESETZ, vol. 1, Allgemeines - Einleitung, annot.
87 (7th ed. 1975); 0. SANDROCK, LIBER AMICORUM BEITZKE 690 (1979).

8. See Judgment of Apr. 2, 1970, Bundesgerichtshof [BGHI (Federal Supreme Court in Civil
Matters, W. Ger.), 53 Bundesgeichtshofes [BGHZ] 383 (1970); Judgment of Oct. 17, 1968, 51
BGHZ 27 (1968).
9. G. BEITZKE, LIER AMICORUM LUTHER 20 (1976); Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2,
annot. lI la (2d ed.); Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 162; Luderitz, Commentary,

supra note 2, annot. 208; Ebenroth & Bippus, Fiihren bilaterale Investitionsfoderungsvertragezu
einerAbkehr vom Sitzprinzip, 34 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 336, 339 (1988).
10. Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 193 (2d ed.); Grossfeld, Commentary, supra
note 2, annot. 85, 374; Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 9, at 339.
11. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States of
America-Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 29, 1954, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 273

U.N.T.S. 3943, BGBI.II 487 [hereinafter TFCN].
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I. Recognition of U.S. Corporations by
Article XXV(5) of the TFCN
Article XXV(5) of the TFCN provides:
As used in the present Treaty, the term "companies" means corporations, partnerships,
companies and other associations, whether or not ... for pecuniary profit. Companies
constituted under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of either
Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their juridical status recognized
within the territories of the other Party.
Article VII(l) of the TFCN is also relevant in this context:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded, within the territories of the
other Party, national treatment with respect to engaging in all types of commercial,
industrial, financial and other activity for gain, whether in a dependent or an
independent capacity, and whether directly or by agent or through the medium of any
form of lawful juridical entity. Accordingly, such nationals and companies shall be
permitted within such territories ...
Finally, item no. 9 of the Additional Protocol in the TFCN provides: "The

provisions of Article VII do not obligate either Party to permit nationals and
companies of the other Party to carry on business in its territories without
fulfilling the requirements which are generally applicable by law."

A.

LEGAL NATURE OF THE

TFCN

Article 25 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (GG) states
that the general principles of public international law take precedence over
German national law. 12 There is, however, no general principle that determines
whether one country is obliged to recognize the legal status of companies
incorporated in another country.1 3 It is, of course, possible that a bilateral

agreement may affect the legal status of foreign companies. Such an agreement
would then derogate German law. Such friendship, commerce, and navigation
treaties are agreements under International Law, 14 which only develop legal
effects interpartes (among the contracting Parties). Once ratified, they obtain the
status of Federal Law. If such treaties define the legal status of foreign

corporations differently from national German Law, they suspend this law lex
specialis derogat legi general.15 The point is that if the TFCN between Germany
and the United States of America is based upon the conflict of laws provisions in

12. Grundgesetz [GG] (German Constitution) states: "The general principles of public intemational law are part of federal law."
13. G. BEITZKE, VORSCHLAGE UND GUTACHTEN ZUR REFORM DESDEUTSCHEN INTERNATIONALEN

PERSONEN- UND SACHENRECHTS 94-136 (Lauterbach ed. 1972); Grossfeld, Commentary,supra note 2,
annot. 125; Ebenroth & Bippus, Die staatsvertragliche Anerkennung auslandischer Gesellschaften in

Abkehr von der Sitztheorie, 41 DER BETRIEB [DB] 842 (1988).
14. Maunz, Commentary, GRUNDGESETZ [GG], art. 25, annot. 15 (Maunz, Herzog, Dirig &
Scholz eds. 1987).
15. H. WEBER & H. VON WEDEL, GRUNDKURS VOLKERECHT 74 (1977); a rule recognized in most
of the world's legal systems.
SUMMER 1990
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the so-called "internal affairs rule" (principle of incorporation)," 6 then the
question of the legal status of American corporations in Germany is not subject
to the "seat rule."
B.

INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XXV OF THE

TFCN

Article XXV(5), sentence 2, of the TFCN declares that "companies . . .shall
have the juridical status recognized within the territories of the other party." Thus
the legal definition of "recognized" becomes crucial. If recognition only
designates a rule relating to aliens, it has no effect on the "seat rule": Such laws
regulate the different treatment to be afforded aliens and nationals. As a matter
of fact, law that regulates the status of aliens is substantive national law' 7 and
hence part of special administrative law. 18 If, on the other hand, "recognize"
means a rule regulating the conflict of laws, then the "seat rule" in Germany
could be suspended since provisions regulating conflicts are not substantive laws,
but laws relating to other laws. 19 Thus, if "recognized" in article XXV(5) of the
TFCN transfers conflicts of law concerning the recognition of American
corporations in Germany to U.S. corporate law, following the "internal affairs
rule," 20 then the "seat rule" does not apply to U.S. corporations intending to
relocate in Germany.
1.Recognition
The word "recognized" as used in the text of article XXV(5) allows three
different possible interpretations. "Recognize" could mean permitting a U.S.
corporation to establish its main base of operation in Germany. 21But it could also
mean that a U.S. corporation requires permission as defined by a special national
regulation act 2 2 in order to acquire a legal status subject to the same rights and
16. Contrary to the "seat rule" this doctrine means that a corporation incorporated and
registered in one country is recognized by the state or country in which it has established its effective
place of business and/or administration.
17. G. MEIER, GRUNDSTATUT UND SONDERANKNUPFUNG IM IPR DES LIECHTENSTEINISCHEN
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS 8 (1979); Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 202 (1st ed.);
Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 559.
18. G. MEIER, supra note 17.
19. R. WILSON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (1960);
Walker, Provisionson Companiesin United States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J.INT'L L. 373, 380
(1956); Wilson, A Decade of New Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 927 (1956).
20. C. EBENROTH, VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN, supra note 2, at 336; Ebenroth, Commentary, supra

note 2, annot. 107 (ist ed.), annot. 114 (2d ed.); Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 127.
21. C. EBENROTH, VERM'GENSZUWENDUNGEN, supra note 2, 314; Behrens, Der Anerkennungsbegriff des Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht, 7 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENS

UND GESELL-

SCHAFrSRECHT JZGRI 499 (1978); Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 114 (2d ed.);
Ebenroth & Sura, Das Problem der Anerkennung im lnternationalen Gesellschaftsrecht, 43
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 315 (1979).

22. Behrens, supra note 21, at 501; Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 115 (2d ed.);
Ebenroth & Sura, supra note 21, at 317; Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 124.
VOL. 24, NO. 2
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duties effective in the original country. On the basis of these two interpretations
one could argue that article XXV(5) only regulates law relating to aliens. The
term "recognize," however, could also be construed as a provision regulating
conflict of laws. Such a provision would refer to the law governing the legal
status of U.S. corporations and thus either to German law (the "seat rule") or to
U.S. law (the "internal affairs rule"). The text of the treaty does not seem to
favor any of these three interpretations.
2. Law Relating to Aliens or to Conflict of Laws?
Comparisons with similar legal provisions in German law suggest that only
one of the three possible interpretations can be excluded: the admission of
foreign companies by means of a special regulating act. German law does not
provide foreign corporations with a special license to conduct business in
Germany. A foreign company whose legal status is recognized in Germany
automatically obtains the right to act as a legal entity. This means the
right to
23
conclude contracts, to sue and to be sued according to German law.
Of the two remaining interpretations of article XXV(5), that of a provision
regulating conflicts between different laws is clearly preferable to that of a
provision requiring that foreign corporations first acquire permission to
conduct business in Germany before they can be regarded as legal entities
under German law.
a. First Argument: Section 12 of the24
German Industrial Code (GewO)
Section 12 of the German Industrial Code (GewO), 25 which has since been
abolished, states that a license to do business in Germany is necessary in order
for a foreign company to be recognized as a legal entity. In addition, section
15(2), sentence 2,26 explicitly states that a foreign company can be prevented
from conducting business in Germany if its legal status has not been recognized.
Here it is possible to see that this law distinguishes between the permission to do
business (which is part of the administrative law relating to aliens), and the
recognition of a corporation as a legal entity. Requiring that a foreign company
acquire legal status as a precondition to its being granted the right to conduct
business is common practice in Germany, 27 and is supported by German case
23. Behrens, supra note 21, at 501; Ebenroth & Sura, supra note 21, at 315, 321; Grossfeld,
Commentary, supra

note 2, annot. 126.

24. Gewerbeordnung [GewO] (German Industrial Code), as revised on Jan. 1, 1978, [1978]
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBI.I] 97, contains regulations concerning safety at work, protection of
minor employees, and business license of enterprises.
25.

Act of July 25, 1984, [1984] BGBI.I 1008.

26. Still effective.
27. C. EBENROTH, VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN, supra note 2, at 335; G. MEIER, supra note 17, at
8; Behrens, supra note 21, at 502; Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 112 (2d ed.);
Ebenroth & Sura, supra note 21, at 316.
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law.28 Prior to its revision, the GewO consistently distinguished between the
recognition of a foreign company's legal status (which is a part of the conflict
rules) and granting it permission to conduct business activities (part of the law
relating to aliens). This distinction necessarily limits the way in which the term
"recognize" can be interpreted.
As used in article XXV(5) of the TFCN the term "recognize" cannot mean
that a license has to be granted to foreign companies under administrative law.
Until section 12 of the GewO was abolished, such a restriction with respect to the
rights of aliens was in full effect, so that it would not have been necessary to
mention it in the TFCN. In fact, article XXV(5) of the TFCN uses the expression
with respect to the conflict of laws. Although section 12 of the GewO has since
been abolished, this interpretation is still valid because section 15, which makes
it possible to prevent a company from conducting business if the foreign
company's legal capacity has not been recognized in Germany, is still in force.
If a foreign company's legal status, according to the German regulations
governing the conflict of laws, cannot be recognized, then the competent
authority may, according to the law relating to aliens under section 15 of the
GewO, prohibit a firm from conducting business in Germany.
b. Second Argument: The Usual Meaning of the Term
It should also be kept in mind that in section 12 of the GewO, as well as in
German legal terminology, the term "recognize" is commonly used with respect
to the conflict of laws. 29 "Recognize" means that foreign law is applicable and
that Germany must accept the legal consequences ensuing from the application
30
of foreign law.
If article XXV(5) of the TFCN only permits the recognition of foreign
companies from the United States, as the contracting party, then this means that
U.S. corporations recognized as legal entities by the law of any of the fifty states
also enjoy the same status in Germany. As long as they maintain their legal status
according to U.S. law, Germany is obligated to recognize this status.
3. Interpretation of the Entire Article XXV(5)
The previous interpretation of article XXV(5), sentence 2, of the TFCN
concerned only the second half of the sentence, 31 which deals with the

28. Judgment of July 15, 1876, Reichsoberhandelsgericht [ROHG] (Supreme Court in Commercial Matters of the Deutsches Reich), 22 OHGE 147 (1876): "in the laws of the Deutsches Reich,
which are the only relevant ones here, there are no provisions which permit the interpretation that a
foreign company, incorporated according to the laws of the country concerned, may not be able to
appear as plaintiff within the domestic territory." See also Grossfeld, Zur Geschichte der
Anerkennungsproblematik bei Aktiengesellschaften, 38 RABELSZ 344, 358 (1974).
29. Behrens, supra note 21, at 509; Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 113 (2d ed.);
Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 127.
30. G. KEGEL, supra note 2, at 366.
31. R. WILSON, supra note 19, at 191; Baade, Multinationale Gesellschaften im Amerikanischen
Kollisionsrecht, 37 RABEtsZ 5, 20-31 (1973); Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 119
VOL. 24, NO. 2
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"recognition" of companies. Since "recognition" applies to rules governing the
conflict of laws, from Germany's point of view article XXV(5) necessarily refers
to corporate law in the United States, that is, corporate law in those states where
the companies in question are incorporated. If it is a state which recognizes the
legal status of the company founded under its law, although its effective place of
business has been transferred to another state of country, then the Federal
Republic of Germany must also accept this as well and recognize the company.
Since the first half of article XXV(5), sentence 2, defines what is meant by a
"company of the other Party," article XXV thus states to whom the provision
applies. As is apparent from the wording, article XXV has additional legal
consequences. It clearly favors applying the "internal affairs rule," because the
definition of "a company of the other Party" refers only to the incorporation
("companies, constituted...") of the company under the applicable laws and
regulations of one of the Parties. An effective or statutory place of business
and/or administration in the country where the corporation was founded is thus
not required. In the United States this only has declaratory consequence, since
the United States already follows the "internal affairs rule" 32 -though with
certain restrictions. 33 In Germany, however, the "seat rule" is suspended when
dealing with U.S. corporations. Our interpretation of article XXV(5) of the
TFCN shows that the mutual recognition of companies depends upon a conflict
of laws rule which respects the laws of the country in which the company was
incorporated.
4. Systematic Arguments Outside of
Article XXV(5) of the TFCN
As long as recognizing the legal status of the other contracting party's
company involves conflict of laws rules or relates only to foreign corporations,
one has to apply other articles of the treaty concerned with foreign companies,
especially article VII(l) and item no. 9 of the Additional Protocol.
34

a. Article VII(l)
Article VII(l) of the TFCN concerns the status of foreigners and of foreign
legal entities, insofar as one can speak of legal entities as "foreigners." 35 For
aliens who normally are treated differently, article VII(l) provides that
companies of the other contracting party of the TFCN must not be discriminated
against as far as this is possible. This article, however, functions in a way similar
(1st ed.); Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 23; Lderitz, Commentary, supra note 2,
annot. 200.
32. For the wording of article XXV para. 5, see supra text section 1.
33. Such restrictions are made by several public laws. See Lfideritz, Commentary, supra note 2,
annot. 200 with citation of more authorities. For other restraints, see infra text section II.
34. See supra text section I.
35. See infra text accompanying section II.A.2. for the so-called "control rule," which refers to
the nationality of its owners or directors, in order to determine the legal status of foreign companies.
See also Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 114 (1st ed.) with citation of more authorities.
SUMMER 1990
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to law relating to foreign corporations 36 because the mere fact of being a foreign
corporation (the legal elements of the rule) involves certain legal consequences
which do not affect the subjects' legal status but only the permission to set up and
conduct business.
37
b. Item No. 9 of the Additional Protocol
When the TFCN was signed, both parties agreed upon the provisions of the
Additional Protocol, which they intended to be part of the Treaty. This explains
the significance of the Additional Protocol for the interpretation of article VII of
the TFCN, which in turn affects the interpretation of article XXV(5) of the
TFCN.
One of the "requirements . . .generally applicable by law" mentioned in item
no. 9 of the Protocol could be the "seat rule," which is normally applicable in
Germany. 38 The Treaty does not explicitly regulate the extent to which U.S.
corporations are subject to German substantive law, 39 although a minority
opinion in the German legal literature considers that the phrase "generally
' 40
applicable law" in item no. 9 of the Protocol also concerns the "seat rule
when the U.S. corporation transfers its effective place of business to Germany.
This opinion, however, is not widely held and has been criticized in several
ways. 4 '
The text of item no. 9 of the Protocol already reveals the nature of the law
relating to aliens when it cites the "permission to carry on business" and not the
recognition of the corporation's legal capacity. As explained above, 42 in German
legal terminology the word "permission" generally means that licenses have to
be issued to aliens by the appropriate authorities. These licenses require in turn
that a foreign corporation be recognized as having legal rights and duties.
Furthermore, item no. 9 also refers to the "requirements . . . generally
applicable by law." It is, however, doubtful, whether "law" in the terms of the
Treaty also designates the noncodified 43 "seat rule," which in Germany is only
a legal construction and for these reasons does not possess the same binding
authority as codified law. In our opinion an interpretation which argues that the

36. See supra text section I.A.
37. See supra text section 1.
38. Judgment of Mar. 21, 1986, BGH, W. Get., 97 BGHZ 269 (1986); C. EBENROTH,
VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN, supra note 2, at 344, 352; Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot.
162 (2d ed.); Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 18, 29.
39. On the question of national public policy restrictions, see infra text section III.C. 1.
40. Lehner, Die Steuerliche Ansiissigkeit von Kapitalgesellschaften-insbesondere zur Doppelten
Ansiissigkeit, 34 RIW 201, 208 (1988).
41.

H. WIEDEMANN, GESELLSCHAFSRECHT 796 (5th ed. 1988); Ebenroth, Commentary, supra

note 2, annot. 11I(2d ed.); Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 13, 843; Grossfeld, Commentary, supra
note 2, annot. 162; Lideritz, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 202.
42. See supra text section .B.2.b.
43. For the reasons of the noncodification, see Hartwieg, Der Gesetzgeber des EGBGB Zwischen
den FrontenHeutiger Kollisionsrechts-Theorien, 42 RABELSZ 431, 444 (1978); Lfideritz, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 202.
VOL. 24, NO. 2
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German "seat rule" is a "requirement . . . generally applicable by law" in the
terms of item no. 9, has to be rejected because German legal terminology
distinguishes very clearly between written law44 and the general legal system.45
This means that the German legislature (Bundestag) can suspend the seat rule
when negotiating international business agreements.
Arguments concerning the background of item no. 9 can also be cited against
the hypothesis that item no. 9 relates to the status of aliens. Since this provision
does not refer to the corporation's effective place of business,4 6 the rule seems
not to be subject to conflict law and, in particular, to make no allowance for the
"seat rule." This conclusion, however, could not be reached without the
criterion of the "effective place of business." The wording of item no. 9 is at
once too narrow (in referring only to business activities but not to the legal status
of the corporation) and too extensive (referring to corporations with effective
place of business outside Germany; but this would be a result incompatible with
the fundamental idea of the Treaty).
Finally, there are also systematic reasons why item no. 9 has the character of
a conflict of laws rule. On the one hand, article XXV(5) of the TFCN guarantees
the legal status of U.S. companies in Germany, even when these companies
transfer their headquarters to another country, as long as the country of origin
still recognizes their legal status. On the other hand, there are good reasons why
a company transferring its headquarters to Germany should not become subject
to binding German corporate law (such as minimum capital, the legal obligation
to disclose the annual financial statement and codetermination). Requiring
American companies to conform to German corporate law would alter the
structure of these companies to such an extent that they would have to
liquidate.4 7 And yet according to German law, there is no statute defining the
legal status of companies which could be separated from general corporate law
(i.e., concerning minimum capital, management bodies, etc.) 48
This is the reason why item no. 9 is a declaratory provision relating to foreign
companies and aliens that only allows the contracting parties to prevent a
corporation from conducting business if the corporation does not respect
domestic law in the host country.49

44. By extension this also means sentences of the Federal Constitutional Court with legal force,
decrees and statutes of corporations under public law.
45. See art. 20(3) GG ". .. the executive power and the courts are bound by the [written] law
and to the [general] legal system." In German, written law means given by the legislative power,
while "Recht" means the whole legal system.
46. For divergence of article XII of the Treaty between the Deutschem Reich and the U.S.A.,
see infra text section l.C.3.a.
47. Ebenroth & Bippus, Die Anerkennungsproblematik im Internationalen Gesellschaftsrecht,
41 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2137 (1988).

48. Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 115 (2d ed.); Ebenroth & Sura, supra note 21,
at 317.
49. That is, provisions concerning industrial safety regulations, environmental protection, rules
for the entry in the Commercial Register, bookkeeping laws, etc.
SUMMER 1990
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C.

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF ARTICLE

XXV(5)

OF THE

TFCN

Article XXV(5) of the TFCN requires that Germany recognize U.S. corporations' legal status and vice versa. This is of enormous significance for a U.S.
corporation seeking to transfer its effective place of business from the United
States to Germany.
1. No Special Legal Status
As indicated above, 50 recognizing U.S. corporations according to conflict of
laws rules does not mean in Germany that this corporation has legal status if it
has been incorporated in accordance with U.S. corporate law. Insurmountable
practical problems would arise if a corporation's legal status were divided
between American and German law. 5 1 These problems are similar to those
arising when one follows the so-called "rule of overlapping." This doctrine,
represented by a minority opinion in the German legal literature,52 maintains that
the personal status of a corporation has to be separated from its other legal
relations. Whereas personal status (legal capacity) is determined according to the
law of the countries in which the corporation was founded, laws concerning other
legal relations (such as minimum capitalization or codetermination) apply only in
those countries where the effective place of business is located. Such a mixture
of different laws which results from the application of this rule should, however,
be avoided since it would be virtually impossible to determine which law has
precedence.
The German Law of Codetermination, 53 which gives employees extensive
rights with nearly equal representation in the supervisory boards, is limited to
German stock corporations. German corporations have, in addition to the
stockholders' meeting and the board of directors, a supervisory board as a third
obligatory administrative body. Where codetermination exists, both stockholders
and employees are on the supervisory board, that in turn elects the board of
directors. This type of supervisory board, which fulfills very important functions
within German corporations is foreign to U.S. corporations. German corporate
law regulates the functions of the board of directors, the supervisory board, and
the shareholder meetings. In addition, German corporate law makes the
recognition of a corporation as a legal entity dependent upon the extent to which
it observes these regulations. United States corporate law, by way of contrast,
provides a company with considerably more autonomy through the by-laws.

50. See supra text section I.B.4.b.
51. See C. EBENROTH, VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN, supra note 2, at 341; Ebenroth & Bippus,
supra note 13, at 848; Ebenroth & Sura, supra note 21, at 320.
52. G. GRASMANN, SYSTEM DESINTERNATIONALEN GESELLSCHAFrSRECHTS annot. 60; Sandrock,
18 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FOR VOLKERRECHT [BERDGEsVOLKRI 73, 113 (1978);
Contra Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 141 (Ist ed.).
53. Mitbestimmungsgesetz (Codeternination Act) of 1976, [1976] BGBI.I 1153.
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2. Consequencesfor Conflict of Law Rules
From a German point of view article XXV(5) of the TFCN has the following
effects on conflict of law rules:
a. German Companies
The "seat rule" is still valid for German companies 54 since article XXV(5) of
the TFCN only covers those corporations which were founded according to
German laws and regulations. The TFCN refers to substantive law; it does not
alter substantive law. From the German point of view the Treaty is designed to
make it possible for U.S. firms to transfer their headquarters to Germany. At the
same time it effectively prevents German companies from leaving the country. In
addition to the requirements of private55 and public law, 56 one of the criteria for
recognizing a German corporation's legal status is that it must have its effective
place of business and its registered office in Germany. If a German firm does not
meet this criterion, its legal status will not57be recognized in Germany, and if
relocating abroad, it will have to liquidate.
b. United States Corporations
The situation differs considerably for U.S. corporations. Most states in the
United States, although there are important exceptions, 58 have adopted the "internal affairs rules." In order to acquire legal status, it is sufficient for the U.S.
corporation to have been founded in accordance with the law of one of the fifty
states. If the company then transfers its effective place of business to another
country, Germany will still recognize its legal status. The most important practical
consequence is that Germany recognizes the legal status of a corporation founded
in the United States (for example, according to the law of the state of Delaware)
not only when it moves its effective place of business from Delaware to another
state, but also when it transfers its headquarters to Germany. The German "seat
rule," which requires that the effective place of business be located in the country
where the company was founded, is no longer in effect insofar as U.S. corporations are concerned.
3. FurtherArguments
The conflict of laws rule in article XXV(5) of the TFCN is of considerable
significance for Germany since it places virtually no restrictions on U.S.

54. See also Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 162 (2d ed.); Ebenroth & Bippus,
supra note 9, at 338; Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 37;
55. Effective articles of incorporation.
56. Correct in registration.
57. Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 171 (1st ed.).
58. Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 122 (lst ed.); Latty, Pseudo-Foreign
Corporations,65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955/56).
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enterprises seeking to relocate in Germany. 59 There are, however, some
indications that the contracting parties wanted these consequences to be subject
to the Treaty.
a. Comparison with the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Consultation between Deutsches Reich and the
United States of America, December 8, 1923
Article XII of the Treaty, 60 which corresponds to article XXV(5) of the
TFCN, is worded as follows:
Limited liability and other corporations and associations, whether or not for pecuniary
profit, which have been or may hereafter be organized in accordance with and under the
laws, National, State or provincial, of either High Contracting Party and maintain a

central office within the territories thereof, shall have their juridical status recognized
by the other High Contracting Party provided that they pursue no aims within its
territories contrary to its laws ....
The right of such corporations and associations of
either High Contracting Party so recognized by the other to establish themselves within
its territories . . . shall depend upon the consent of such Party.

The first paragraph of this provision is generally considered to refer to a
conflict of laws rule and not alien status. 61 The important difference between
article XXV(5) of the TFCN and this provision lies in the fact that, in order to
be recognized, a company had to be incorporated ("organized") in accordance
with the laws of one of the contracting parties and had to maintain a central office
within the territories of that country. Subsection 2, however, also permitted the
contracting parties to place further restrictions on the business activities of
corporations "so recognized." From this one can draw two conclusions.
As article XII shows, the early treaty clearly distinguished between the
recognition of foreign corporations (the conflict of laws rules) and the permission
to conduct business (an aspect of law relating to aliens). This is a further
indication that the term "recognize" as used in article XXV(5) of the TFCN
represents a conflict rule. This interpretation, moreover, suggests that in 1954 the
contracting parties of the TFCN wanted to make extensive use of the mutual
recognition of the other party's corporations by waiving the effective place of
business as a requirement. 62 In the United States it was sufficient for the
recognition of a corporation's legal status that the registered office be established
within the state or country of incorporation; the effective place of business was
not required. Wilson 63 describes this as follows:
A "company" is defined simply and broadly to mean any corporation, partnership,
company or other association which has been duly formed under the laws of one of the

59. For the restraints, see infra text section II.
60. Ratified by Law on Aug. 17, 1925, [1925] RGBI.II 795.
61. Behrens, supra note 21, at 499; Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 47, at 2137; Grossfeld,
supra note 28, at 344.
62. Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 47, at 2137; Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 13, at 843.
63. R. WtLSON, supra note 19, at 191.
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contracting parties; that is any "artificial" person acknowledged by its creator, as
distinguished from a natural person, whether or not for pecuniary profit. Every
association meeting this simple test of valid existence must be accounted by the other
party of a company of the party of its creation, and have its juridical status recognized
without any reservationfor the laws of the forum. 64

b. Comparison with the Convention of Establishment 65
between the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain
Comparing the TFCN with this agreement between Germany and Spain
provides a further indication that article XXV(5) of the TFCN, with respect to
the conflict of laws rule, does indeed have a considerable effect on the
recognition of the legal status of U.S. corporations in Germany. The corresponding article of this Treaty states:
The legal status of the companies of either contracting party will be recognized within
the territories of the other party. The other party is authorized to refuse this recognition
only if the aims and activities of the company concerned represent an offense against
the principles or rules, which
this party considers part of public policy in terms of
66
private international law.
This provision regulates the legal conditions for recognizing the contracting
party's companies. As Spain also follows the "internal affairs rule," ' 67 the agreement suspended the "seat rule." 68 Article XV(2) of the Treaty between Germany
and Spain, like article XXV(5) of the TFCN, requires for the recognition of the
other party's corporation only that it be incorporated under the laws of the
other
69
party and not that the effective place of business be within the country.
Article IX of the Treaty between Germany and Spain, 70 which is similar in
content to article VII of the TFCN, regulates the conduct 7of
professional and
t
economic activities as stated in the provision of article IX.
The distinction made in this Treaty between recognizing legal status and
permitting companies to set up and conduct business also indicates that the
conflict of laws rule was intended as a means of determining the legal status of
a foreign company. Indeed, article XV refers explicitly to Spanish law, which

64. Emphasis added.
65. Convention of Establishment, Apr. 23, 1970, Federal Republic of Germany-Spain, ratified
Sept. 7, 1972, [1972] BGBI.IL 1041.
66. Convention, supra note 65, art. XV(2) (translation by the author-not official).
67. Liideritz, supra note 2, annot. 200; Von Hoffmann & Ortiz-Arce, Das neue spanische
internationalePrivatrecht,39 RABELSZ 647-62 (1975).
68. See also Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 13, at 844; H. WIEDEMANN, supra note 41, at 796;
Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 162; Lilderitz, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 208.
69. For the public policy restrictions, see infra text accompanying section II.C.1.
70. "Nationals of either contracting party may exercise within the territories of the other party
economic and professional activities of any kind under the same conditions as natives; if therefore a
permission is required, this will be conceded under the same conditions as natives. This is
analogously valid for companies." Convention of Establishment, supra note 65, art. IX (translation
by the author).
71. See BGBI.II 1041, 1046.
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only requires incorporation under Spanish law for acknowledging the company's
legal status. Whether and under which circumstances the company so recognized
is allowed to exercise business activities within Germany is regulated by
provisions relating to aliens in article IX of the Treaty. These provisions also
favor a strict separation between the conflict of laws rule-recognition of legal
status-and the law relating to aliens-permission for foreign companies to set
up and conduct business.
72
Since the German "seat rule" is not a binding part of German public policy,
the distinction between the conflict of laws rule and law relating to aliens is
determined only in part by the public policy laid down in the Treaty. 73 Not all
binding regulations (for example, liability provisions or auditing practices), but
only those principles which directly concern fundamental aspects of German law
can be part of German public policy. 74 If this were not the case, the regulations
would not have been referred to in the Treaty, and recognition of legal status
guaranteed by the Treaty would be impossible.
c. Comparison with the Treaty Establishing the 75
European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty
Articles 52, 58 and 220 of the EEC Treaty also distinguish between the law
relating to aliens concerning the freedom of foreign companies to set up and
conduct business, and conflict of law rules relating to the recognition of their
legal status.
Although the right to establish corporations in the Common Market is
generally acknowledged, the mutual recognition of EEC members' corporations
(in terms of the "internal affairs rule") has not yet been put into effect. Such
reciprocal recognition was agreed on in the Treaty of February 29, 1968,76 but
the Treaty has not yet been ratified in Germany.
d. Comparison with Other Agreements Concerning
77
International Law Concluded by Germany
Treaties promoting foreign investment entered into by Germany and numerous
other countries do not include such extensive recognition of a foreign company's
legal status. They either require an effective place of business within the territory
of the contracting party as a precondition for recognition, or they refer to the laws
of the other party without suspending the "seat rule."

72. Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 47, at 2137.
73. For further discussion, see infra section II.C.

74. Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 13, at 848; Kreuzer, Commentary,

MONCHENER KOMMENTAR,

vol. 7, art. 6 EGBGB, annot. 3.
75. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 28 U.N.T.S. 11.
76. [1972] BGBI.II, 369 (ratified by Germany but not yet law); see C. EBENROTH,
VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN, supra note 2, at 339; Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 219
(2d ed.); Luederitz, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 206.
77. See Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 9, at 336; Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot.
11 (a); Luderitz, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 207.
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Common to all these treaties is the clear distinction made between recognition
of legal status and permission to conduct business. The most-favored nation
clause, often included in these treaties, does not nullify this distinction since this
clause only guaranties equal treatment relative to law relating to aliens. As far as
conflict of laws rule is concerned, a foreign company, having transferred its
effective place of business to Germany, is no longer subject to the rules of the
Treaty which define which kinds of companies of the other party have to be
recognized by Germany. 78
In such cases Germany would not recognize the legal
status of the corporation.
D.

PROVISIONAL RESULT

Germany recognizes U.S. corporations founded under U.S. law in terms of
article XXV(5) of the TFCN when they transfer their effective place of business
to Germany. The restrictions laid down in article VII(l) of the TFCN and item
no. 9 of the Additional Protocol, however, resemble the law relating to aliens and
hence do not distinguish between the recognition of legal status and an evaluation
of the corporation's other legal relations.
II. Limits of Recognition
Since public control of private corporations in Germany is less strict than in
the United States or Great Britain, German companies could theoretically shift
their effective place of business to the United States or found subsidiary
corporations there in order to take advantage of the less restrictive private
regulations. They could then transfer the corporation's effective place of
business back to Germany in order to avoid the restrictive nature of German
private corporate law, (e.g., with respect to liability, auditing procedures, or the
"troublesome" codetermination). Such activities would eventually produce a
large number of pseudo-foreign corporations in Germany subject not to German
regulations, but to the more liberal corporate law of the United States. The
question, however, is whether there are legal principles that have priority over the
TFCN and that would prevent the abuse of differences between corporate law in
the United States and in Germany. Some of the factors that could possibly affect
such practices are the general principles of international law, noncompliance with
U.S. corporate law, or unwritten restrictions in German public policy.
A.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law represents an initial restriction since, as we have already
pointed out, 7 9 there is no general obligation to recognize a foreign corporation's
78. Besides this formal argument there are also substantive reasons for opposing recognition of
such company; see, e.g., Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 9, at 342.
79. See supra text section I.A; supra note 14.
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legal status. An individual's effective relation to a particular country is a
criterion determining whether he is a member of that country. 80 This effective
relation or connection is called a "genuine link."
1. Dogmatic Creation of a Genuine Link

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) developed the principle of an effective
tie or genuine link in the well-known Nottebohm Case. 81 Nottebohm, originally
a German national, had lived in Guatemala for many years, but had "purchased"
citizenship in Liechtenstein, although the ICJ did not regard Liechtenstein as being
entitled to concede diplomatic protection to Nottebohm against Guatemala. Between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein there existed only the formal tie of citizenship
not confirmed by any effective personal ties Nottebohm had to this country.
This decision is controversial for two reasons. First, it is not certain whether
the decision established a general principle of international law. 82 If we take into
account the extensive proofs in judicial decisions and practice 8 concerning the
effective link as a requireient of dual nationality, however, it would seem as if
a general principle has been established. These judicial decisions, of course, are
also concerned with the principle of territorial sovereignty and other international
matters. The legal status of foreign corporations, however, cannot be determined
by relying on decisions and arguments made in other areas, since this would not
only be inconsistent but could also open the door for considerable abuse.
Secondly, it is also uncertain whether an individual's effective link to a country,
as recognized in international law, can be used to determine a corporation's legal
status, or whether the term "nationality" cannot be applied to such an artificial
entity. Even the opponents of the Nottebohm decision, however, acknowledge
that the principles established by the International Court may be applied by
analogy to the recognition of foreign corporations. 84 Thus, if a U.S. corporation
intends to transfer its effective place of business to Germany, it should still keep

80. It is irrelevant whether this means the nationality of a natural person or the belonging to a
country of a legal person; see Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 13, at 844; B. GROSSFELD, PRAXIS DES
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS 539 (1975); Wengler, Die Aktivlegitimation
zum vilkerrechtlichen Schutz von Vermegensanlagen Juristischer Personen im Ausland, 23 NJW
1473 (1970).

81. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4.
82.

B.

GROSSFELD,

BASISGESELLSCHAFTEN

IM INTERNATIONALEN

STEUERRECHT

172 (1974);

Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 164; Wengler, supra note 80, at 1477. Contra P.
MULLER, DEUTSCHE STEUERHOHEIT UBER AUSLANDISCHE TOCHTERGESELLSCHAFTEN

88 (1970); Seidl-

Hohenveldern, InternationalEconomic Law, 198 REc. DESCOURS 9, 84 (1986).
83. P. BEHRENS, DIE GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN UND
AUSLANDISCHEN
RECHT
120 (1976);
K. MEESSEN,
VOLKERRECHT
UND INTERNATIONALES
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 102 (1975); A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT 790 (3d ed.

1984); W. WENGLER, 2 VOLKERRECHT 936-47 (5th ed. 1964); C. EBENROTH, VERMOGENSZUWENDUGEN,
supra note 2, at 356; Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 599; Grossfeld, Internationalprivatrechtliche Probleme multinationaler Korporationen, 18 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FOR VOLKERRECHT 73, 132 (1978).

84. Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 82, at 86.
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sufficient effective ties to the United States in order not to lose its legal status and
85
thus run the risk of being considered a pseudo-foreign corporation.
2. The Criterion of Genuine Link
The principle of a "genuine link," as applied to companies, indicates that a
foreign corporation, besides the formal tie of incorporation and registration in the
Commercial Register, must also have effective legal relations to the country
where it was first incorporated. There must be sufficient proof that the
corporation concerned still participates in the economy of the country of origin,
and not just marginally, and that it was not founded with the sole intention of
avoiding or abusing laws. It would probably be sufficient if a U.S. corporation,
which has transferred its effective place of business to Germany, still maintains
branch offices or subsidiaries in the United States. Similarly, the corporation
would demonstrate compliance with the "genuine link" requirement if its main
decision-making body, the board of directors, meets in the United States, where
the corporation formally remains registered in the Commercial Register. It would
also suffice if the board of directors delegates responsibility for daily business
operations to a management committee. The board of directors, which would
retain the right to act in its own name, is still responsible for making fundamental
decisions, but it would be the management committee that implements them.
A proper application of the genuine link criterion should, however, make it
unnecessary to rely upon the "control rule." This doctrine was developed during
World War II in order to determine whether a foreign company belonged to allied
or nonallied countries. The most important criterion was the nationality of the
individuals who were owners or directors of the company. 86 The control rule,
according to the prevailing view, 87 is no longer sufficient to determine a
company's legal status. Instead, it only applies to the question of diplomatic
protection for a corporation when the stockholders are nationals of the country
which is demanding diplomatic protection.
This was the case in the ICJ's decision in Barcelona Traction Light & Power
Ltd. 88 The Court rejected Belgium's suit for diplomatic protection of this
company. The fact that the stockholders were Belgians was not sufficient in the
opinion of the board to establish an effective tie between the company and
Belgium.
85. See supra text section III.B.2.
86. G. GRASMANN, SYSTEM DES INTERNATIONALEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS annot. 88 (1970);
Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 115 (1st ed.); Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2,
annot. 565; Lideritz, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 198.
87. G. MEIER, supra note 17, at 34; Rohr, Der Konzern im IPR unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung des Schutzes der Minderheitsaktioniire und der Gliiubiger, 23 SCHWEIZER STUDIEN ZUM
INTERNATIONALEN RECHT 119 (1983).
88. Barcelona Traction Light & Power Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4; see also
Seidl-Hohenveldem, Legitimation des Heimatstaates zur Ausuibung diplomatischer Schutzrechte
zugunsten von Aktioniiren bei Verletzung vdlkerrechtlicher Normen im Ausland, 16 RIW 221 (1970);
Wengler, supra note 80, at 1473.
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Nonetheless, the stockholders' or directors' nationality may be another important indication of a genuine link. If, as in the example above, the board of
directors of a U.S. corporation which has transferred its effective place of business
to Germany, is composed at least partially of U.S. nationals, there is good reason
to assume an effective connection between the corporation and the United States.
3. Summary
In conclusion it can be said that a U.S. corporation with its effective place of
business in Germany still needs effective connections to the United States. These
can include nonmarginal business activities in the United States, the stockholders' or directors' nationality, branch offices or subsidiaries maintained within the
United States or regular meetings of the board of directors in the United States.
B.

NONCOMPLIANCE WITH

U.S.

REGULATIONS FOR INCORPORATION

The recognition of a corporation's legal status under the conflict of laws rule
refers, in article XXV(5) of the TFCN, only to "corporations, constituted under
the applicable laws and regulations." The Treaty, in other words, exempts
companies of other countries from this recognition, even when they are lawfully
established in the United States, as well as such U.S. corporations which have no
legal status in the United States because they violated domestic law.
1. Violations of the Law
In the United States, as well as in Germany, corporations which violate U.S.
corporate law through their corporate structure, their application for entry in the
89
Commercial Register, or their by-laws are not eligible to obtain legal status.
Germany is neither obligated nor allowed to recognize such illegally constituted
companies. In my opinion, however, nonappealable decisions by U.S. courts or
the decision to liquidate a company made by U.S. authorities, should be binding
for German courts and authorities as well. This is the conclusion I draw from
section 328(1), no. 5, of the ZPO. 90 Because the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany as contractual partners agreed to recognize each other's
corporations, this agreement must also be valid for legal and administrative
decisions that deny corporations legal status. If this is the case, then the
reciprocity required by section 325(1), no. 5, of the ZPO is fulfilled as far as the
United States is concerned.
2. Public Policy in the United States
Another point that deserves discussion is whether the recognition of a U.S.
corporation's legal status can be refused when its relocation in Germany is seen
89. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 574 (3d ed. 1983).
90. ZPO is an abreviation of Zivilprozessordnung (Code of Civil Procedure). ZPO § 328(1)
states, "The recognition of foreign judgements is excluded if reciprocity is not guarantied."
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as a breach of U.S. public policy. This could be the case if the transfer of the
company ensues in a manner which can be considered an abuse of the law.
As far as it is possible to compare the presuppositions, the systematic
organization, and the aims of German and U.S. conflict law, it would seem, from
a German point of view, as if most of the states in the United States have adopted
modified versions of the "internal affairs rule," whereby U.S. incorporation is
sufficient for the recognition of a company. 91 This was necessary because
practice had shown that it was possible to avoid the more stringent corporate laws
of some states by incorporating companies within states with "liberal or tax"
corporate law. Corporations founded according to such "liberal or tax" laws,
however, never conducted business in these states but in that state where they had
originally planned to locate their headquarters. It was Latty 92 who first called
such corporations "pseudo-foreign corporations":
Of course a primary characteristic of the pseudo-foreign corporation would be that its
main business activity takes place locally. If the main business is elsewhere, even
though the shareholders or creditors may all be local residents they have undertaken to
deal with an enterprise that is essentially an out-of-state-one, and93it would seem a little
high handed to hold such an enterprise to local corporation law.
When a corporation is founded under foreign law and performs nearly all its
economic transactions in the state in which its effective place of business and
administration is located, it is only "superficially" a foreign corporation. If a
company, for example, was incorporated in the state of Delaware according to
the liberal Delaware Corporate Law 94 but had never conducted business there or
transferred its headquarters to another state soon thereafter, then the state where
the effective place of business is located could consider this company a
pseudo-Delaware corporation.
These criteria were applied in the famous Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Sobieski
case. 95 Western Air Lines, Inc. was incorporated according to Delaware law, but
exercised its principal economic activities in California. The California Court of
Appeals held the application of Delaware Corporate Law as "inequitable, unfair
and unjust," because the state of California was sufficiently involved in the
affairs of this out-of-state corporation. Thus, California was permitted to apply
its own law relating to the internal matters of this corporation.
According to American legal thought Delaware Corporate Law is not applicable
when a corporation in Delaware conducts most of its business in the state where its

91. A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 15 (1976); DRUCKER, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 29; Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 119 (1st ed.); Grossfeld, Commentary, supra

annot. 23.
See Latty, supra note 58, at 137.
Id. at 161.
C. EBENROTH, VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN, supra note 2, at 357; B. GROSSFELD, INTERNATIONALES UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 30 (1986).
95. Western Air Lines Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
note 2,
92.
93.
94.
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main office is located. This principle, however, should not be extended too far since
it involved the claim of only one of the corporation's stockholders, and only concerned
the corporation's internal operations. Whether this decision can be extended to cover
corporate law also seems doubtful since the necessary consequence of a corporation
being considered as a pseudo-foreign corporation would be to deprive it of its legal
status in the state where it effectively conducts business. American international tax
and civil law already uses the term "real seat of the corporation" (commercial
domicile, principal place of business), although the corporation's legal status is not
affected by this. 96 It is questionable whether the Western Air Lines, Inc. decision was
ever intended to have such extensive effects. The constitutionality of this decision,
moreover, is also questionable.
In sum, if a U.S. corporation violating U.S. corporate law loses its legal
status, then Germany is neither allowed nor obligated to acknowledge this
corporation if it decides to transfer its effective place of business to Germany.
And if the principles concerning pseudo-foreign corporations in the United States
have not yet been applied to the recognition of a corporation's legal status, then
Germany may not rely on these principles with respect to a U.S. corporation.
C.

GERMAN PUBLIC POLICY

In pursuance of article 6 of the EGBGB, 97 the use of the "internal affairs
rule" could represent a breach of German public policy if the "seat rule" and its
consequences were such a fundamental legal principle that it could not be
abolished by international agreements.
1. National Public Policy Restrictions
In the Convention of Establishment between Germany and Spain 98 it was
agreed that both parties may rely on national public policy to determine the
preconditions for recognizing the other party's corporations. In this case, relying
on national public policy does not involve any serious problems. But it is
questionable whether public policy can also be used in international agreements
in which public policy has not been as explicitly determined as in the TFCN. In
this Treaty, German public policy concerning the recognition of a foreign
company could have been suspended. 99 This is, of course, a question of
interpretation, but it seems as if the parties involved wanted to replace public
policy with special agreement.100 It would be inconsistent with the aims of such

96. C. EBENROTH, VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN, supra note 2, at 349, 357.
97. EGBGB stands for Einfiihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (Introductory Law of
the German Civil Code), which contains intertemporal and international conflict of law provisions.
Article 6 states, "The application of a foreign law is excluded if the application would offend the
morality or the purpose of a German law."
98. Convention, supra note 65.
99. Kreuzer, Commentary, MONCHENER KOMMENTAR, supra note 74, art. 30 EGBGB, annot.
28 (1st ed.).
100. Liideritz, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 27.
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treaties (which are supposed to create legal certainty among the parties) if
national law could be brought in "through the back door" and applied to foreign
companies. This also explains why it is doubtful that the United States and
Germany ever wanted public policy to remain a valid criterion.
2. Public Policy in the TFCN
In the absence of alternative interpretations it seems that the contracting
parties wanted to suspend the German "seat rule" by means of article XXV(5)
of the TFCN. German public policy consequently cannot conflict with the
recognition of a U.S. corporation if this corporation violates national public
policy in the United States as well. Only to the extent that German and U.S.
public policy corresponds is it possible to speak of the contracting parties having
preserved its validity. This, however, is public policy on a very low level.
Prohibiting the abuse of laws may be part of public policy as recognized within
the framework of article XXV(5) of the TFCN.'o' This prohibition characterizes
both U.S. as well as German principles of law and is also part of international
law. 102 The incorporation of a legal entity and the subsequent transfer of the
effective place of business can be considered an abuse of law affecting the
relations between the United States and Germany if this action was only intended
to circumvent the more stringent corporate law of the country where the company
originally was founded. The absence of any "genuine link"'' 0 3 between a
corporation and the country where it was first incorporated is an indication of
such possible abuse. A third indication is when a company originally founded in
Germany is liquidated and then reincorporated in the United States, but soon
after shifts its effective place of business back to Germany. Such a corporation
would be a German modification of a pseudo-foreign corporation. 0 4 But it
should not be considered an abuse of law if such a company, registered in the
Commercial Register as located in the United States and having its effective
place of business in Germany, was created in order to avoid taxation. This would
even be the case if a U.S. corporation, with its effective place of business and the
larger part of its fixed assets in Germany, did not want to liquidate and
reincorporate under German law in order to avoid taxation of its hidden reserves
in the United States. Section 42 of the AO,10 5 which states that legal modes of
organization cannot be explicated as a means of avoiding taxation, refers only to
the abuse of tax laws, not of corporate law. In the example we have cited there

101. Latty, supra note 58, at 137; Western Airlines Inc. v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12
Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
102. E. MENZEL & K. IPSEN, VOLKERRECHT 353 (2d ed. 1979); 1. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN,
VOLKERRECHT 122 (6th ed. 1987); H. WEBER & H. VON WEDEL, supra note 15, at 74.
103. See supra text accompanying section II.A. 1.
104. Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 129-33 (2d ed.); Grossfeld, Commentary,
supra note 2, annot. 42-44; C. EBENROTH, VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN, supra note 2, at 259; Latty,
supra note 58.
105.

AO stands for Abgabenordnung (German Fiscal Code), [1976] BGBI.1 1749.
SUMMER 1990

480

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

will not be any real abuse since the corporation in question only aspires to equal
treatment with German corporations that are not subject to taxation when they
transform their legal form.
3. Binding German CorporateLaw
The question remains whether German corporate law, as a fundamental
principle of German public policy, could have priority over article XXV(5) of the
TFCN. Two binding principles are particularly relevant here: the principles of
raising and maintenance of capital (liability) within the German AG and
GmbH"° 6 and the law of codetermination.
a. Raising and Maintenance of Capital
A German corporation must maintain a minimum of DM 100,000 (pursuant to
section 7 of the AktG). ° 7 There are very strict regulations under German law
controlling the acquisition and maintenance of capital. ' 08 These provisions are
meant to protect the stockholders and the creditors against undercapitalization of
the corporation. The creditor of a German corporation has a guarantee in the
form of capital stock, which is not necessarily the case with a U.S. corporation
because of the lesser amount of capitalization.
Despite the possibility of an inadequate credit standing among U.S. corporations, this risk is deemed minimal when a company petitions to shift its effective
place of business to Germany. The German creditor who contracts with such a
corporation can calculate the risk. In fact, the risks of undercapitalization are
lower if the corporation's effective place of business is in Germany because in
this case the corporation's assets can be used more easily to guarantee its
liability. The immediate availability of these assets also makes it easier for
creditors to take legal action against the corporation. For creditors and investors
there would be no substantial difference between a U.S. corporation having its
headquarters in Germany or in the United States since the risks are the same.
Anyone in Germany acquiring shares or investment fund certificates of a U.S.
corporation, regardless of which country it is located in, is aware of both the
higher risks and the potentially higher yields.
b. The Law of Codetermination
Under German law, there are two kinds of codetermination: codetermination
in the shop council' 0 9 and codetermination on the supervisory board. 110 Codeter106. AG stands for Aktiengesellschaft (a stock corporation). GmbH stands for Gesellschaft mit
beschriinkter Haftung (limited liability company, or close corporation).
107. AktG stands for Aktiengesetz (German Corporation Act).
108. See, e.g., § 9 AktG (prohibiting the issuing of shares below par); § 71 AktG (prohibiting a
corporation from acquiring its own shares); § 57 AktG (prohibiting the return of contributions).
109. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] (German Shop Constitution Act) [1972] BGBI.I 13.
110. Mitbestimmungsgesetz [MitbestG] (German Codetermination Act) [1976] BGBI.I 1153.
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mination in the shop council does not cause any problem in this context. When
a shop council is set up according to German shop council law, it is the factory
and not the corporation that is affected. The shop council, moreover, has no
supervisory functions in the company and no connection with the company's
structure. A U.S. corporation with its effective place of business in Germany
must tolerate the establishment of such shop councils if it wishes to comply with
the German Shop Council Act. This is also true for the German subsidiaries and
nonindependent branch offices of foreign corporations."'
The German Codetermination Act, by way of contrast, could theoretically
produce a more difficult situation since it is not only binding as German
corporate law but also a fundamental principle of the German economic and
social order. 112 In practical terms, however, codetermination can only be realized
in those enterprises which already have a supervisory board constituted and
elected according to German law. 113 A transfer of codetermination to U.S.
corporations is thus not possible because of their different structure.
The Federal Supreme Court in Civil Matters (Bundesgerichtshof) 1 4 has
argued in a controversial decision' 15 that foreign corporations are in violation of
German public policy "if these foreign companies are not able to realize the
fundamental conceptions of values determined by German lawmakers." It would
be impossible to enforce codetermination in a U.S. corporation without making
substantial changes in the company's structure. It seems scarcely conceivable
that a Delaware corporation that has transferred its effective place of business to
the Federal Republic of Germany could have a supervisory board in which half
of the members are union-oriented employees and which elects an employee
director capable of directly influencing corporate planning. The system of
elections and the composition of the supervisory board are such an integral part
of the German legal system that they would have a disruptive effect on foreign
companies.
If a U.S. law required codetermination for employees, however, the company
would not be able to evade enforcement by transferring its effective place of
business into Germany. Enforcement in such cases would remain under the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
D.

VIOLATIONS OF THE

EEC

TREATY

Recognizing U.S. corporations with their headquarters in Germany could
conflict with binding EEC regulations. The United States and Japan view with
111. K. FITTING, AUFFARTH & KAISER, Commentary, BetrVG, § 1, annot. 4 (15th ed. 1987).
112. C. EBENROTH, VERMOGENSZUWENDUNGEN, supra note 2, at 363-65.
113. Election of the board of directors.
114. 32 NJW 488 (1979).
115. Contra Wengler, Sonderanknuipfung, positiver und negativer ordre public, 34 JURISTENZEI-

TUNG [JZ] 175 (1979); Luer, Borsentermingeschaftsfdhigkeit un Differenzeinwand, 34 JZ 171 (1979).
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some degree of skepticism the efforts of the European Community to create a
unified common market"' 6 in Europe. The notion of Europe as a "fortress,"
which has been making the rounds lately, is an expression of this skepticism.
Once the borders within Europe are eliminated, foreign nationals and corporations will be confronted with a wealth of new legal problems. My concern in this
article is with only a part of this enormous problem. Will the freedom to conduct
business in Europe that article XXV(5) of the TFCN guarantees to U.S.
corporations conflict with EEC regulations? Or will U.S. corporations be able to
gain access to the Common Market through the Federal Republic of Germany?
1. Formal Violations of EEC Regulations by the TFCN
According to article 113 of the EEC Treaty, Commerce and Investment
Treaties such as the TFCN between Germany and the United States fall within
the domain of the European Community.17 Consequently, article 234 of the
EEC Treaty states that previous bilateral treaties between Common Market
countries and third party countries are not to be affected, but that conflicts with
EEC regulations should be eliminated. The EEC Commission, moreover, has a
negative attitude toward the conclusion of bilateral Investment and Commercial
Treaties. On April 27, 1987,'18 the Council agreed to prolong certain friendship
and commercial treaties. The agreement, however, remained in effect only until
December 31, 1988, and has not since been renewed. Because this also affects
the TFCN between Germany and the United States, the treaty is in formal
violation of EEC regulations.
For several reasons, however, this formal violation does not lead to the automatic
annulment of the TFCN. Germany's membership in the EEC does not mean that it
loses its sovereign right to conclude such agreements under international law. 19 In
addition, the practice of the EEC Commission to extend existing treaties shows that
the European Community is intent on prolonging and not discontinuing such agreements. Finally, since the TFCN also contains regulations that do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the EEC, it is impossible to annul such agreements.
2. Substantive Violations of EEC Regulations
Article XXV(5) of the TFCN, which regulates the freedom of U.S. corporations to shift their effective place of business to Germany, does not conflict with

116. Art. 8a, EEC Treaty, states, "The community will take the necessary measures in order to
realize the completion of the internal market until December 31, 1992. The internal market includes
an area without borders, services and capital . . . is guaranteed." (translation by the author).
117. The EEC Council, in its first decree concerning the commercial policy, already integrated
explicitly the treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation in the common commercial policy of
the EEC; see Decree of the Council of Oct. 9, 1961, 710 J.0. EUR. COMM. 1264/61 (1961); see also
CHR. VEDDER, DIE AUSWARTIGE GEWALT DES EUROPA DER NEUN 22 (1980).
118. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 111) 32 (1987).
119. I. SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, DAs RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATIONEN EINSCHLIESSLICH DER SUPRANATIONALEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 269 (4th ed. 1984); H. KROCK, VOLKERRECHTLICHE
VERTRAGE IM RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 146 (1977).
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EEC regulations. Of course, establishing a common market in 1993 should
guarantee the free transport of goods and persons within the EEC. Freedom of
movement, however, does not mean the right to transfer a corporation's effective
place of business from one member country to another. 120 All that a corporation
is allowed to do is establish subsidiaries in another member country. For this
reason U.S. corporations cannot use article XXV(5) of the TFCN to shift their
headquarters from Germany to other member countries in the EEC. 12' The
efforts on the part of the EEC to unify corporate law within the Common Market
are still in the initial stages at the moment.1 22 We do not, however, expect
considerable progress in the future, since opposition interest within the individual member countries is still very strong.
3. Advantages of Article XXV(5) of
the TFCN for U.S. Corporations
Although article XXV(5) of the TFCN does not allow U.S. corporations to
shift their effective place of business from Germany to other EEC countries, it
does offer them a considerable advantage in conducting business within the
Common Market. This advantage concerns law relating to aliens. The EEC
considers a U.S. corporation whose headquarters has been shifted to Germany,
and whose legal status is recognized, as a German corporation according to
German conflict law. In order to acquire the legal status of a German corporation
it is not necessary that a foreign corporation be founded according to German
corporate law, but only that its headquarters be in Germany and its legal status
be recognized according to conflict of laws rules. 123 Since U.S. corporations that
have shifted their headquarters to Germany in accordance with article XXV(5) of
the TFCN have the same status as an EEC corporation, it is possible for U.S.
corporations to gain access through the back door of "fortress Europe," if indeed
the EEC can be viewed as a fortress. The advantages of gaining access to the
Common Market in this way are considerable.
III. Legal Competence of Basic Rights
In accordance with article 19(3) of the GG, legal persons enjoy certain basic
rights, such as the right to possess private property, the freedom to choose one's

120. The current legal state of affairs prevents a German corporation [AG] from "moving" to
France. France would refuse to recognize the legal status of this "invader."
121. Two alternatives are possible: either the creation of a uniform corporate model for the EEC
(societas europea) or the development of bilateral agreements that would allow corporations to
transfer their headquarters to other member countries in the EEC.
122. A. BLECKMANN, EUROPARECHT 336 (4th ed. 1984); R. STEINBRUCK, GRUNDRECHTSSHUTZ
AUSLANDISCHER JURISTISCHER PERSONEN 9 (dissertation, Miinchen 1981); as France is concerned, see
L. Ltvy, LA NATIONALITt DES SociETgs 241-97 (1984).

123. That means nondiscrimination, free access to the Common Market, eligibility for EEC
subsidies and many other advantages.
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trade or profession, and the freedom to develop one's personality. The question
is whether these rights are also guaranteed to U.S. corporations recognized by
article XXV(5) of the TFCN.
A.

CRITERIA FOR RECOGNIZING LEGAL STATUS OF BASIC RIGHTS

According to article 19 of the GG, only national companies enjoy basic rights.
The only exceptions are the so-called basic rights of procedure, which guarantee
equal and fair treatment by the German authorities and the courts of justice
(articles 17, 19(4), 101(1), and 103 of the GG). This explains why 24foreign
corporations are generally not concerned with basic substantive rights.'
B.

CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT

125

OF A CORPORATION

There are several criteria for the residency requirement of a corporation, that
is, for determining whether a corporation can be considered national or foreign.
The first condition is that the corporation must have its headquarters in Germany,
an indication of a very close effective relationship between the country and the
corporation.
A second criterion, representing the prevailing view in Germany, requires that
a company be founded and incorporated according to German law, 126 but a
substantial minority' 27 deviates from this view. It is, however, legally and
factually unacceptable to consider a U.S. corporation as a national corporation
when it still has effective ties to the United States (genuine link) and its legal
status is based on U.S. law. Neither Germany nor the United States are interested
in having U.S. corporations with their effective place of business in Germany
considered as national companies. For the United States this is a matter of
national sovereignty. This is also the reason why neither legal status nor
recognition under the conflict of laws rule can lead to a U.S. corporation being
considered a national company by meeting the residency requirement. A U.S.
corporation cannot meet the residency requirement according to article 3 of the
GG, which would guarantee equal treatment, since it cannot fulfill the main
requirement that it be a national corporation, even though its effective place of
28
business is located in Germany.'

124.
125.
national
126.

Ebenroth & Bippus, supra note 47, at 2137; Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 594.
Residency requirement means the criteria that have to be met in order to be treated as a
(resident-attribute).
Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 504 (2d ed.), Grossfeld, Commentary, supra note

2, annot. 594; W.W. SCHMIDT, GRUNDRECHTE UND NATIONALrrAT JURISTnSCHER PERSONEN 92 (1966).

127. V. Mutius, Commentary, BONNER KOMMENTAR zuM GRUNDGESETZ art. 19(3), annot. 55 (1974).
128. Ebenroth, Commentary, supra note 2, annot. 581 (2d ed.); Grossfeld, Commentary, supra
note 2, annot. 592; W.W. SCHMIDT, supra note 126, at 174.
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IV. Summary
Germany, in contrast to the United States, follows the effective "seat rule" in
matters involving the conflict of laws rule. This means Germany only recognizes
a corporation's legal status if this corporation has been founded under German
law and if its registered office and effective place of business is in Germany.
Article XXV(5) of the TFCN forms an important exception to this rule. Germany
also recognizes U.S. corporations whose legal status has been recognized in the
United States when they transfer their effective place of business to Germany or
to another country.
Article XXV(5) of the TFCN has to be considered as a conflict of laws rule and
not as law relating to aliens. Germany is obligated to recognize a U.S. company
incorporated in the United States since article XXV(5) refers to U.S. and not to
German law. This is the conclusion I draw from a close examination of the TFCN
and article XXV(5), and from a comparison with other international treaties
concluded between Germany and other countries.
There are, however, some restrictions. If the legal status of U.S. corporations
is not recognized in the United States, then Germany is neither obligated nor
allowed to recognize such a corporation. Such legal defaults may include the
abuse of laws, breach of U.S. public policy, or absence of any genuine link
between the corporation and the United States.
Germany, moreover, is not able to recognize a U.S. corporation if this
corporation is only a pseudo-foreign corporation without any genuine ties to the
United States. German public policy can oppose the recognition of a U.S.
corporation only if this corporation has committed what is considered to be a
violation of public policy in the United States. Binding German corporate law
does not prevent recognition, because it is not possible, and would be
incompatible with the TFCN, to force binding German law (such as codetermination on the supervisory board) on a U.S. corporation without changing the
corporation's structure. This form of recognition, however, does not mean that
U.S. corporations with their effective place of business in Germany can be
treated like national companies, since article 19(3) of the GG does not apply to
them.
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